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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4269
___________
DYLAN STEPHEN JAYNE,
Appellant
                                                             
v.
PIKE COUNTY CORR FAC, et al.,
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-01113)
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2009
Before: MCKEE, HARDIMAN and COWEN , Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 23, 2009)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Dylan Stephen Jayne, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s order. 
On June 21, 2007, Jayne filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
2the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging several misdeeds by the Pike County
Correctional Facility and several of its employees.  The complaint, while lengthy, lacks
the structure necessary to assess the exact claims that Jayne attempts to advance.  The
District Court, however, evaluated the complaint liberally to include several types of
claims, including: (1) challenges to his state court prosecution and conviction; (2)
allegations that his First Amendment right to meaningful access to the court was violated;
(3) allegations that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs; and (4) allegations that his prison placement
and custodial classification were improper.  The District Court granted Jayne’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and then determined that all of his claims had fatal defects that
warranted sua sponte dismissal. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of  a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is
plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  If a complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal, a district court must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative
amendment even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d
229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on grounds of
bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.  Id. at 235-36.   
To the extent that Jayne seeks to challenge his underlying state prosecution and
conviction, the District Court properly found that he could only bring such claims in a 28
3U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus.  The District Court, however, erred in
dismissing the remaining claims without providing Jayne with an opportunity to amend
his complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
There is no doubt that, in its current form, Jayne’s complaint is wholly inadequate. 
Nevertheless, given the opportunity to amend, he may be able to properly set forth claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated
due to the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976), and/or that his custodial classification presented an atypical hardship as is
required to establish a constitutional violation under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995).  Further, the district court dismissed Jayne’s claims of denial of access to the
courts as time-barred.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1993); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524.  While it appears that some of the complained-of actions
occurred outside the limitation period, we cannot say, at this stage, that the facts alleged
in the complaint plainly demonstrate that a cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitation.  See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint is proper only if it appears on the face of the complaint that it is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations).  Accordingly, because of the dearth of
information regarding Jayne’s claims, we cannot conclude that amendment of his
complaint will be futile.  See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.,
482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that, in civil rights cases, “leave to amend
4must be granted sua sponte before dismissing” the complaint).  
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
